Collusion-free protocols prevent subliminal communication (i.e., covert channels) between parties running the protocol. In the standard communication model (and assuming the existence of one-way functions), protocols satisfying any reasonable degree of privacy cannot be collusionfree. To circumvent this impossibility result, Alwen et al. recently suggested the mediated model where all communication passes through a mediator; the goal is to design protocols where collusion-freeness is guaranteed as long as the mediator is honest, while standard security guarantees continue to hold if the mediator is dishonest. In this model, they gave constructions of collusion-free protocols for commitments and zero-knowledge proofs in the two-party setting.
proceeded in stages with an auctioneer going from room to room, informing the participants about the results of the previous round and taking their next bid. It would have been possible in this case to replace the auctioneer with a server mediating the communication between all parties.
Our Contributions
In addition to introducing a definition of collusion-freeness in the mediated model, Alwen et al. also gave the first constructions of collusion-free protocols in this setting. They showed protocols for commitment and zero-knowledge in the two-party case, but left open the questions of general secure computation as well as dealing with more than two parties. In this paper we solve these open questions, and show the first multi-party protocol for collusion-free computation of arbitrary functionalities in the mediated model. Feasibility is not trivial in this setting, in part because we aim to satisfy a stronger definition of security than that put forth by Alwen et al.; see below. ( We view this strengthened definition as an additional contribution of our work.) As a third contribution, we also prove composition theorems in the mediated setting that should prove useful for future work.
The paragraphs that follow briefly describe the most important differences between our definition and that of Alwen et al. [1] ; formal definitions are in Section 2. The next section provides a high-level overview of our protocol that emphasizes the technical difficulties that arise.
Aborts as a subliminal channel. The definition in [1] allows parties to communicate some large (but bounded) number of bits by aborting the protocol; specifically, in an r-round protocol each party can communicate roughly log r bits to all other parties. Moreover, Alwen et al. conjecture that this is unavoidable. We show that this conjecture is false. In our definition we allow only a single bit to be communicated, where this bit indicates whether some party aborted at some point in the protocol but does not reveal which parties aborted or in which rounds these aborts occurred. Achieving this stronger notion introduces many of the complications in designing our protocol.
Common randomness. The definition in [1] allows parties to use the protocol to agree on a shared random string, even if this is not implied by the functionality being computed. 1 (Indeed, the ideal model in [1, Def. 1] allows the distinct simulators for each party to use the same random tape R; see also the comments in [1] that follow the definition.) In game-theoretic contexts, in particular, this is problematic [11, 10] . Our definition of collusion-freeness rules out this possibility.
Overview of our Protocol
The discussion here omits certain details, and is meant only to illustrate the high-level structure of the protocol. A formal description of the protocol is given in Section 3.
Let P 1 , . . . , P n be a set of n parties, each communicating with a mediator P n+1 , who wish to compute some (randomized) functionality F. Let π be a protocol that securely computes F in the standard communication model where all parties have access to a broadcast channel. (In fact, we assume without loss of generality that all messages in π are sent over the broadcast channel.) We compile π to obtain a collusion-free protocol Π in the following way. For each message msg sent by some party P i in protocol π do:
1. P i and the mediator run a protocol for secure two-party computation of a functionality F π compute that outputs to the mediator the next message msg that P i would send in the underlying execution of π. (A secure computation is needed since P i will not actually know any of the messages sent by other parties in previous rounds of π; see step 2.)
If the mediator does not obtain a valid msg (i.e., if P i aborts or provides incorrect input to F π compute ), then the mediator sets msg to some default value. (This step is essential if we wish to prevent parties from using aborts as a covert channel.) 2. The mediator sends independent commitments of msg to each of the other parties.
At the end of the protocol, the mediator runs a secure two-party computation with each party P i that allows P i to learn their output, as specified by protocol π.
It is not too difficult to argue that the above protocol is collusion-free when the mediator is honest. Intuitively, this is because each party sees only independent commitments to messages rather than the messages themselves. However, the following issues arise if the mediator is dishonest:
Authentication. The mediator should be unable to modify the messages of honest parties. To prevent this, we actually require F π compute to output (msg, σ), where σ is a valid signature 2 by P i on msg, and we then have the mediator send commitments on both these values to the other parties. Furthermore, F π compute will require the mediator to prove that all previous commitments contain appropriately signed messages and, if not, will output an error.
Preventing subliminal channels based on aborts. Signing each message (as just described) prevents a dishonest mediator from modifying honest parties' messages, but introduces a potential problem with collusion-freeness: now, if a party P j aborts then the mediator has no way of generating a (commitment to a) default message along with an appropriate signature. We fix this by allowing the mediator in this case to send a commitment to a "dummy message" with no signature; we also change F π compute so that if it detects a dummy message it returns an error message to the mediator only. Thus, parties cannot detect whether anyone has aborted until the end of the protocol, and never learn which (or how many) parties aborted nor the round(s) in which an abort occurred. Furthermore, if a dishonest mediator ever uses a dummy message, then it receives error messages from then on.
Ensuring "broadcast". Protocol π is secure under the assumption that parties communicate over a broadcast channel. In our compiled protocol, where all communication is routed through the mediator, we need a way to ensure that a dishonest mediator sends (different commitments to) the same message to all parties. We implement this "mediator broadcast" by, roughly speaking, having the mediator (1) collect signatures from all parties on the committed messages; (2) send independent commitments on these signatures to all parties; and then (3) prove to each party independently that all parties have signed a commitment to the same underlying message. As above, in case of an abort we allow the mediator to send a "dummy commitment" to the parties.
Handling concurrency. When the mediator is honest, the two-party protocol computing F π compute , as well as the sub-protocols used to implement mediator broadcast, are run sequentially. But when the mediator is dishonest, it may run concurrent executions with the honest parties. We thus need all the two-party protocols being run to be secure under (bounded) concurrent self composition.
Definitions
Preliminaries. We denote the security parameter by k. A function µ(·) is negligible if for every polynomial p(·) there exists a value N such that for all k > N it holds that µ(k) < 
Security in the mediated model -preliminaries. We use the real/ideal paradigm for defining security of protocols, but our real and ideal worlds differ somewhat from the standard ones and collusion-freeness is defined in a different manner than usual. Our real world is essentially standard except that all communication is between parties P 1 , . . . , P n and the mediator P n+1 , and there is no direct communication between P i and P j , for i, j ≤ n, unless the mediator allows it. We define two different ideal worlds depending on whether the mediator is honest (and collusionfreeness is the goal) or dishonest (in which case we default to the standard notion of security). 3 We also explicitly incorporate a PKI into our real and ideal models; see the discussion below. As in [1] , we capture collusion-freeness (when the mediator is honest) by requiring the existence of independent simulators, one for each malicious party, such that their joint output in the ideal world is indistinguishable from the joint output of the malicious parties in the real world. Let F = (f 1 , . . . , f n+1 ) denote the functionality the parties wish to compute, where each f i maps n + 1 inputs to a single output. (We allow the mediator to provide input and receive output, something not done in [1] .) We implicitly assume that any protocol under discussion for computing F is correct: i.e., if parties P 1 , . . . , P n+1 hold a consistent PKI, have inputs x 1 , . . . , x n+1 , respectively, and run the protocol honestly, then each party P i receives output f i (x 1 , . . . , x n+1 ), distributed appropriately in case these functions are randomized.
PKI. Alwen et al. [1] suggest that public keys for each party should be generated as part of the protocol itself. Unfortunately, if all communication is done via the mediator this means that a corrupt mediator can impersonate parties and "disconnect" the parties into disjoint groups running independent computations (as in [2] ). For this reason, Alwen et al. assume a "broadcast-honest" mediator who reliably forwards all public keys at the beginning of the protocol. We simplify things by just assuming that all players begin the protocol with a consistent PKI. (We do not assume honestly generated keys or require parties to prove knowledge of their keys.)
Both our approach and that of Alwen et al. introduce the possibility that a party's public key can be used as a subliminal channel, but we do not view this as a serious concern. For one, public keys are generated before inputs are given to the parties, so any such communication will be independent of parties' inputs. Furthermore, parties that are not aware of each other before execution of the protocol will necessarily generate their keys independently, whereas parties that are aware of each other before executing the protocol cannot be prevented anyway from communicating an arbitrary amount of information in advance.
PKI establishment: For i ∈ H, party P i honestly generates a pair of signature keys (pk i , sk i ).
Each corrupted party P i may output any public key pk i of its choice. At the end of this stage, all parties (including the mediator) are given the vector (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) of public keys.
Input determination and protocol execution: Each party P i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) is given input x i . (We stress that this is done only after the PKI is established.) Party P i is also given auxiliary input aux i ; honest players ignore this input. Independent random coins r 1 , . . . , r n+1 for the parties are also chosen. The parties then run the protocol, with honest parties (including the mediator) acting as directed by Π, and corrupted parties behaving arbitrarily.
Result of the experiment: At the conclusion of the protocol, let out i , for i ∈ I, denote the entire view of the corrupted party P i , and let out i , for i ∈ H ∪ {n + 1}, denote the final output of P i (as dictated by Π). Given a set of adversarial strategies
to be the random variable consisting of the stated outputs following an execution of Π where the parties are given inputs and auxiliary inputs as specified.
Collusion-Freeness (with an Honest Mediator)
Throughout this section, we assume the mediator is honest. In this ideal world, all parties communicate only with a trusted party computing F. In particular, corrupted parties are unable to communicate with each other and therefore cannot communicate information about their inputs or coordinate their actions (beyond what they have agreed upon in advance). Let I be the set of corrupted parties, and let H be the set of honest parties (other than the mediator) as before. An execution in this ideal world proceeds as follows:
PKI establishment: A PKI is established exactly as in the real world. That is: for i ∈ H, party P i honestly generates signature keys (pk i , sk i ). Each corrupted party P i outputs any public key pk i of its choice. All parties are then given the vector (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) of public keys.
Input determination: Each party P i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) is given their input x i . Party P i is also given auxiliary input aux i ; an honest player ignores this input. Independent random coins {r i } i∈I for the corrupted parties are also chosen.
An honest party sets x i = x i and sends x i to F. A corrupted P i may send any x i of its choice. Unless otherwise specified, if any
Note that a malicious party who "aborts" by sending ⊥ to F communicates (at most) one additional bit to all other parties beyond what is directly implied by F. Furthermore, this decision to abort must be made independently of the output of F on the given inputs.
Result of the experiment: At the conclusion of the protocol, let out i , for i ∈ I, denote an arbitrary value output by P i , and let out i , for i ∈ H ∪ {n + 1}, denote the value given to P i by F. Given a set of adversarial strategies
to be the random variable consisting of the stated outputs following an ideal-world execution where the parties are given inputs and auxiliary inputs as specified.
Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define collusion-freeness of a protocol. If we followed the standard definitional paradigm, we would require that for all I and any set of efficient real-world strategies A I = {A i } i∈I , there should exist a set of efficient ideal-world strategies S I = {S i } i∈I such that the corresponding real-and ideal-world outcomes are computationally indistinguishable. A deficiency of this approach is that it allows each S i to depend on I as well as all the A j (i.e., even for j = i), and thus this approach does not adequately model collusionfreeness. Since we want each S i to depend only on A i , we instead require the existence of a set of efficient transformations {Sim i } i∈ [n] such that setting S i = Sim i (1 k , A i ) for i ∈ I makes the real and ideal worlds indistinguishable. While this is not the most general definition possible, we achieve this definition in our work (and, moreover, all our transformations are black-box). 
Definition 1 Let
i } i∈I , setting S i = Sim i (1 k , A i ) for i ∈ I implies ideal cf F,S I ( aux) (1 k , x) x, aux∈∈({0,1} * ) n+1 , k∈N c ≡ real mediated Π,A I ( aux) (1 k , x) x, aux∈({0,1} * ) n+1 , k∈N .
Security (with a Dishonest Mediator)
The definition in the case of a dishonest mediator is essentially the standard one, with the main exception being that honest parties cannot communicate directly in the real world. For completeness, we include the definition in Appendix A. A protocol satisfying the definitions of both this and the previous section will be called a collusion-free protocol securely computing F.
Collusion-Free Multiparty Computation in the Mediated Model
We construct a collusion-free protocol Π for secure computation of an arbitrary (poly-time) functionality F = (f 1 , . . . , f n+1 ). We first introduce the components of our protocol, and describe the protocol in full detail in Section 3.4. High-level intuition for the protocol was given in Section 1.2.
Tools and Building Blocks
Our protocol uses a number of standard cryptographic primitives and tools, which we review here.
Some standard primitives and functionalities:
-Commitments. Let C be a perfectly binding commitment scheme, where C(m; r) denotes a commitment to m using random coins r. The decommitment of com = C(m; r) is dec = (m, r). We assume all commitments are some known, fixed function of the message length.
-Signature schemes. Let (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks. Range(Gen) denotes the set of possible outputs of Gen, and we assume that one can decide in polynomial time whether a given (sk, pk) lies in Range(Gen).
(This is without loss of generality, since we may always take sk to be the random coins used by Gen.) We assume all valid signatures are some known, fixed function of the message length.
-Two-party functionalities. We use ideal functionalities to model various sub-protocols used in Π. Standard functionalities we use are the commitment functionality F com , the coin-tossing functionality F ct , the zero-knowledge functionality F zk , and the signature functionality F Sign :
, where λ denotes the empty string.
2. The coin-tossing functionality is defined by F ct (1 , λ) = ((r, s), C(r; s)), where |r| = and both r and s are uniformly distributed.
3. Let R be an N P-relation. Functionality F zk for the relation R is defined by
The signature functionality is defined as:
A protocol π that securely computes F (in the standard sense): Let π be an (n + 1)-party protocol that securely computes F in the standard sense [8] , in the standard communication model where all parties have access to a public (but authenticated) broadcast channel. Precisely, π is secure-with-designated-abort for any number t ≤ n + 1 corrupted parties, where the mediator P n+1 is designated as the party who can prematurely abort the protocol. Roughly speaking, this means that the protocol guarantees privacy and correctness regardless of how many parties are corrupted, and guarantees output delivery and complete fairness as long as the mediator is not corrupted. For technical reasons, we also assume that π is proven secure using a black-box simulator. We assume the following about π, all of which can be ensured using standard techniques:
-All messages in π have the same, fixed length. In any given round only a single party broadcasts, and the identity of the party who broadcasts depends on the current round number only.
-Say π has r rounds. Then P n+1 learns its output in round r − 1; party P n+1 broadcasts in round r; and every other party learns its output in this final round.
Dummy commitments: As described in Section 1.2, everything the mediator sends to the parties will be "wrapped" inside a commitment. When all parties behave honestly, these will all be commitments to legitimate protocol messages of π along with a digital signature. If some party P i aborts (or otherwise deviates from the protocol), however, an honest mediator will not be able to generate a valid commitment of this sort (in particular, the mediator will be unable to forge an appropriate signature). Nevertheless, we do not want some other party to learn that P i aborted the protocol. We achieve this by allowing the mediator to send special "dummy commitments" to a distinguished value dummy. (I.e., a dummy commitment takes the form C(dummy; r).) For the sake of concreteness, dummy can be taken to be a string of 0s of the appropriate length if we require that all legitimate messages be prefixed by a '1'.
Oblivious Computation of π
The general structure of protocol Π, as described in Section 1.2, has the mediator send to each P j commitments to all the protocol messages of π. Thus, P j cannot compute its π-messages directly
The parties' public keys are (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ). Functionality F π compute runs with two parties P j and P n+1 and works as follows: -P j inputs a pair of commitments com input and com rand ; a vector of commitments C; and a round number rid. In addition, P j sends two strings dec input and dec rand , and its signing key sk j .
-P n+1 inputs a pair of commitments com input j and com rand j ; a vector of commitments C j ; and a round number rid . In addition, P n+1 sends a vector dec j .
-Upon receiving the above, F π compute does: , or dec j does not contain valid decommitments to all the commitments in C j , then send ⊥ to P n+1 and halt. respectively. Compute the next message msg that party P j would send in protocol π when running with input x j , random tape r j , and after receiving messages msg 1 , . . . , msg . In addition, compute σ = Sign sk j (msg, rid). Send (msg, σ) to P n+1 and halt. (since it cannot directly observe the π-messages of other parties), but must instead compute these messages by executing a two-party protocol with the mediator. Specifically, we define a functionality F π compute that computes the next π-message of P j along with a signature of P j on that message, and a functionality F π output that enables P j to obtain its π-output. (The actual functionalities we require are more complex because we must also check for incorrect behavior on the part of the mediator.) These are defined formally in Figures 1 and 2 . Observe that only the mediator P n+1 receives output from F π compute , and only P j receives output from F π output .
Mediator Broadcast
Protocol π assumes that all parties communicate over a broadcast channel. When the mediator is corrupt, we therefore must ensure that the mediator sends (commitments to) the same message to all honest parties. Note that checking for signatures on protocol messages, as done by F π compute and F π output , only ensures that this holds for the messages of honest parties; it does not prevent a dishonest mediator from sending different messages on behalf of corrupted parties (who may collude with the mediator and sign multiple messages). We achieve the above using what we refer to as "mediator broadcast". The mediator P n+1 begins holding a message m, and at the end of the protocol each party P i obtains an (independent) commitment com i to a message m i that is unknown to P i . (Note that m i is well-defined, since C is perfectly binding.) The desired functionality is, informally, as follows: If all parties are honest, then m i = m for all P i . If P n+1 is honest, then there is an m ∈ {m, dummy} such that m i = m The parties' public keys are (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ). Functionality F π output runs with two parties P j and P n+1 and works as follows: -P j inputs a pair of commitments com input and com rand , and a vector of r commitments C. In addition, P j sends two strings dec input and dec rand .
-P n+1 inputs a pair of commitments com input j and com rand j
, and a vector of r commitments C j . In addition, P n+1 sends a vector dec j .
-Upon receiving the above, F π compute does:
, then send ⊥ to P j and halt.
2. If dec input (resp., dec rand ) is not a valid decommitment to com input j (resp., com rand j ), or dec j does not contain valid decommitments to all the commitments in C j , then send ⊥ to P j and halt. . Compute the value out j that party P j would output in protocol π when running with input x j , random tape r j , and after receiving the messages msg 1 , . . . , msg r . Send out j to P j and halt. The functionality computing the output of π for all honest parties P i . If P n+1 is dishonest, then there is an m such that m i ∈ {m , dummy} for all honest parties P i . This is a weak form of broadcast, but suffices for our application.
In Figure 3 , we formally define a functionality F sid bcast , parameterized by a session id sid, implementing the above. (An honest mediator chooses r 1 , . . . , r n uniformly at random, and sets H = [n]; an honest P i sends b i = 1.) We stress that the functionality always outputs a commitment for each party, even if some (dishonest) party uses input ⊥. Our protocol Π sid bcast realizing F sid bcast proceeds, roughly speaking in the following three stages:
2. P i generates a signature σ i on (com i , sid), and sends σ i to P n+1 .
3. If any P i fails to send a valid signature, then P n+1 sends (independent) dummy commitments to all parties. Otherwise, P n+1 sends an independent commitment to (com 1 , σ 1 , . . . , com n , σ n ) to all parties. In either case, P n+1 then proves to each party in zero knowledge that the commitments it sent take one of these forms.
The actual protocol Π sid bcast is slightly more complex. Furthermore, for technical reasons we do not use commitments, signatures, or zero-knowledge proofs directly but instead work in the (F com , F Sign , F zk )-hybrid model. The complete protocol and a proof of security are given in Appendix B.
A Protocol Π for Collusion-Free Secure Computation
We now describe a collusion-free protocol Π that securely computes F in the (F com , F ct , F π compute , F π output , F sid bcast )-hybrid model. When these functionalities are realized using protocols designed for the mediated model, we obtain a protocol for the real mediated model. Functionality F sid bcast runs with P 1 , . . . , P n , P n+1 as follows:
-The mediator P n+1 inputs a message m, random coins r 1 , . . . , r n , and a set H ⊆ [n].
-If b = 1, then: Our protocol consists of three stages. In the first stage, the parties commit to their inputs and random coins for a protocol π that securely computes F (in the standard sense). In the second stage, the parties simulate π, round-by-round, as follows. If it is P j 's turn to speak (for j ∈ [n]), then P j runs F π compute with the mediator; in this way, the mediator obtains the next message msg of the protocol along with a signature of P j on this message (and the current round number). If it is the mediator's turn to speak, then the mediator simply computes the next message msg of the protocol on its own. The mediator then runs "mediator broadcast" using msg and the signature. As long as everyone behaves honestly, each party thus learns commitments to all messages of the protocol. In the third stage, the mediator runs F π output with each P j to enable P j to learn its output. We now describe the protocol formally.
The protocol begins with all parties holding the same vector of public keys pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ); party P i also holds input x i and, if 1 ≤ i ≤ n, its own secret key sk i .
Stage 1 -input commitment and coin tossing:
1. Each P j executes F com with P n+1 , where P j chooses random s j and provides input dec
be the commitment received by P n+1 from F com .
2. Each P j executes F ct with P n+1 , where the input length is the number of coins needed to run π. We denote by dec rand j = (r j , s j ) the output of P j and by com rand j the output of P n+1 .
Stage 2 -round-by-round emulation of π: The mediator P n+1 initializes abort = false. Then, for i = 1 to r − 1, the parties run the following:
1. (P n+1 learns the round-i message of π.)
Case 1: Party P j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, is supposed to broadcast in the ith round of π. , r 1 , . . . , r n , H = [n] ) and every other party P j provides input 1.
Each party P j defines com j i to be the commitment that it received from F sid bcast . Note that P n+1 , given its output from F sid bcast , can compute the commitments {com j i } j∈ [n] , and knows the corresponding decommitments.
Stage 3 -output determination:
1. If abort = true then P n+1 sets msg r = dummy and sets out n+1 =⊥. If abort = false then P n+1 computes its π-output out n+1 and final message msg r locally (it can do this since P n+1 sees all π-messages "in the clear"). In either case, the mediator then sets sid = 1r, chooses random r 1 , . . . , r n , and runs F sid bcast with all the other parties, where P n+1 provides input (msg r , r 1 , . . . , r n , H = [n]) and every other party P i provides input 1. The mediator outputs out n+1 .
Each party P j defines com j r to be the commitment that it received from F sid bcast . Note that P n+1 can compute the commitment, and knows the corresponding decommitment. 
The mediator

Proof of Security
We first prove that Π is a collusion-free protocol that securely computes F in the (F com , F ct , F sid bcast , F π compute , F π output )-hybrid model. A proof of the following appears in Appendix C. 
We now show that when the ideal-world functionalities are instantiated using protocols satisfying appropriate definitions of security, we obtain a collusion-free protocol that securely computes F in the real mediated model. We obtain this as a corollary of the following composition theorems. -C is a perfectly binding commitment scheme and (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is a secure signature scheme;
-π securely computes F (in the standard communication model) as specified in Section 3.1;
-F com , F ct , F π compute , and F π output are instantiated by a single protocol 5 ρ that is secure under m-bounded concurrent self-composition [14] (m will be specified in the proof below); -F sid bcast is instantiated using protocol Π sid bcast of Appendix B, where F com , F Sign , and F zk are realized by the same protocol ρ as above.
Note that Π cf is defined in the real mediated model, and all the components above can be constructed under the assumption that enhanced trapdoor permutations exist. We now prove that Π cf is a collusion-free protocol securely computing F.
In the case of an honest mediator, this follows directly from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 using the fact that the "mediator broadcast" protocol of Section 3.3 is collusion-free and the observation that any two-party protocol secure in the standard sense is trivially collusion-free. (If ρ is secure under m-bounded concurrent self-composition, it is also secure in the stand-alone sense.)
In the case of a dishonest mediator, the proof is slightly more involved since the hybrid-world protocol Π, as specified, does not fulfill the requirements of Theorem 4.3 (because Π sid bcast is not a two-party protocol). Nevertheless, observe that Π sid bcast consists only of calls to the two-party functionalities F com , F Sign , and F zk . Thus, if we define Π to be the same as protocol Π but using Π sid bcast instead of F sid bcast , it follows that Π does fulfill the requirements of Theorem 4.3. Observing that this changes the output distribution by at most a negligible amount (by security of Π sid bcast ), we have that Π securely computes F in the ( 
A Definitions of Security for a Dishonest Mediator
In this section, we assume a dishonest mediator. The real-world model is, of course, unchanged. Since a corrupted mediator can allow arbitrary communication between corrupted parties, however, we treat all corrupted players as a single coordinated adversary A and syntactically re-write the definition that way. (Note that honest parties still have no direct communication with each other.) The definition that we present is otherwise the standard definition of security with abort, meaning that fairness and output delivery are not guaranteed. We allow any number of corruptions. Let I ⊂ [n] ∪ {n + 1} denote the set of corrupted parties including the mediator, and denote by H = [n] \ I the set of uncorrupted parties. An execution in the real world proceeds as follows:
PKI establishment: A PKI is established as before. We stress that, even though the mediator is dishonest, we continue to assume that a consistent PKI is established. (We view the PKI as something that is established long before protocol execution begins.)
Input determination and protocol execution:
A is given the inputs {x i } i∈I of the corrupted parties, along with auxiliary information aux. Each honest P i is given input x i . Independent random coins r A and {r i } i∈H for the parties are also chosen. The parties then execute the protocol with honest players acting as directed by Π, and the adversary A behaving arbitrarily.
Result of the experiment: At the conclusion of the protocol, let out A denote the entire view of A, and let out i , for i ∈ H, denote the final output of the honest P i (as dictated by Π). Given an adversary A, define
to be the random variable consisting of the stated outputs following an execution of Π where the parties are given inputs (and A given auxiliary input) as specified.
The second ideal world. Let I and H be as above. As in the previous ideal model, honest parties only communicate with the trusted party computing F. Because the mediator is dishonest, corrupted parties may now freely communicate with each other and we therefore view these parties as a single coordinated adversary S. An execution in this ideal world proceeds as follows:
PKI establishment: There is no PKI in this ideal world. Note that this is the usual convention when defining security of protocols, and the only reason we include a PKI in the ideal world defined in Section 2.2 is because there we needed to explicitly model information "leaked" via corrupted parties' public keys.
Input determination:
The adversary S is given the set of inputs {x i } i∈I of the corrupted parties, along with some auxiliary information aux. Each honest party P i is given its own input x i . Independent random coins r S are also chosen.
An honest party sets x i = x i and sends x i to F. The adversary S sends {x i } i∈I to F, where these may be determined arbitrarily. F then hands {f i (x 1 , . . . , x n+1 )} i∈I to S, after which S specifies a set ∅ ⊆ H ⊆ H. Each honest party i ∈ H is given f i (x 1 , . . . , x n+1 ), whereas each i ∈ H \ H is given ⊥.
Note that output delivery, agreement, and fairness cannot be guaranteed regardless of the number of corruptions, since the corrupted mediator controls all communication.
Result of the experiment: At the conclusion of the protocol, let out S be an arbitrary value output by S, and let out i , for i ∈ H, denote the value given to P i by F. Define
Here, the definition takes the standard form: 
B A Protocol for Mediator Broadcast
We describe a protocol Π sid bcast implementing mediator broadcast, and prove its security. Parties begin holding the same values for sid and pk, and each honest P j holds a signing key sk j . The mediator holds as input a message m of some fixed length, coins r 1 , . . . , r n , and a set H. (Note that for an honest mediator running Π sid bcast in our protocol, it will always be the case that r 1 , . . . , r n are chosen at random and H = [n].) Each party P j holds a bit b j . (For an honest party b j = 1.) The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. P n+1 chooses random values ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n . Then P n+1 runs F com with each P j , where the mediator uses (m, ρ j ) as its input. The output of P j from F com is denoted com j .
2. P n+1 runs F Sign with each P j , where P n+1 sends (pk j , (com j , sid)) as its input. P j sends (sk j , pk j , (com j , sid)) as its input if b j = 1, and sends ⊥ otherwise.
Let σ j be the output given by F Sign to P n+1 .
3. If σ i =⊥ for all i, P n+1 sets b = 1 and then runs two instances of F com with each P j :
• P n+1 chooses random ρ j and sends ((com 1 , σ 1 , . . . , com n , σ n ), ρ j ) to the first instance of F com .
• If j ∈ H, the mediator P n+1 sends (m, r j ) to the second instance of F com . If j ∈ H, the mediator P n+1 sends (dummy, r j ) to the second instance of F com .
If there exists an i with σ i =⊥, P n+1 sets b = 0 and then runs two instances of F com with each P j :
• P n+1 chooses random ρ j and sends (dummy, ρ j ) to the first instance of F com .
• P n+1 sends (dummy, r j ) to the second instance of F com .
Let com j , com j denote the output of P j from the first (resp., second) instance of F com .
4. Define relation R, parameterized by sid and pk, as follows: R (com, com), (dec, dec , dec) = 1 iff all the following hold:
(a) dec is a valid decommitment to com. Let (com 1 , σ 1 , . . . , com n , σ n ) be the underlying message in this case.
(b) dec is a valid decommitment to com. Let m be the underlying message in this case. P n+1 runs F zk (for the above relation R) with each P j . The input of P j is com j , com j , and the input of P n+1 contains these commitments and the appropriate decommitments.
5. Each party P j , for j ∈ [n], decides on its output as follows: if it receives '1' from F zk , then it outputs com j ; otherwise, it outputs C(dummy; 0 k ). The mediator P n+1 outputs b.
We highlight that the above protocol consists only of calls to the ideal functionalities F com , F Sign , and F zk ; there are no other protocol messages. We now prove security of Π sid bcast :
Theorem B. 
Proof:
Here we have an honest mediator. Let I denote the set of corrupted parties. We need to show independent transformations {Sim i } i∈I that satisfy Definition 1. In fact, our transformations will be black-box. Sim i , given oracle access to P i , does as follows: 0. Sim i runs P i to generate pk i . Then Sim i is given the vector of public keys pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ), a bit b i , and an auxiliary input aux i , and it runs P i on these inputs.
1. Sim i simulates an ideal call to F com by giving P i a commitment com i to a 0-string of the appropriate length.
2. Sim i simulates an ideal call to F Sign by extracting inputs (sk i,1 , pk i,1 , (com i,1 , sid i,1 )) from P i , and returning output ⊥ to P i . Then:
, pk i ) ∈ Range(Gen) (these include the case when P i 's input is ⊥), then Sim i sends 0 to the trusted party computing F sid bcast .
• Otherwise, Sim i sends 1 to the trusted party computing F sid bcast .
Sim i receives in return a commitment com i .
3. Sim i simulates the first ideal call to F com by giving P i a commitment com i to a 0-string of the appropriate length. It simulates the second call to F com by giving P i the commitment com i .
4.
Sim i then simulates an ideal call to F zk by extracting (com i,2 , com i,2 ) from P i . Then:
• Otherwise, Sim i returns 1 to P i
Finally, Sim i outputs whatever P i outputs, and halts.
It is straightforward to see that Definition 1 holds for the {Sim i } i∈I defined as above. Indeed, the only difference between the hybrid-world execution of protocol Π sid bcast and the ideal-world execution of F sid bcast is with regard to the commitments {com i , com i } i∈I . Since, when the mediator is honest, these commitments are generated independently with fresh random coins in each experiment, computational hiding of C implies that the two experiments are indistinguishable. Claim B.3 Let C be a perfectly binding commitment scheme, and let (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) be a secure signature scheme. Then Π sid bcast securely computes F sid bcast in the (F com , F Sign , F zk )-hybrid model.
Proof:
We now have a dishonest mediator. Let I denote the set of corrupted parties, including the mediator, and let H denote the honest parties. In the proof that follows, we assume that every honest party P i holds input b i = 1; this is justified since, in our protocol that makes calls to Π sid bcast , this will always be the case.
Given an adversary A controlling the parties in I, we construct a simulator S with black-box access to A that works as follows: 0. For each i ∈ H, the simulator S runs (sk i , pk i ) ← Gen(1 k ). The simulator runs A to obtain the public keys {pk i } i∈I . Let pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) denote the vector of public keys.
S is given inputs {x i } i∈I and auxiliary input aux. It runs A on these inputs and pk.
1. For each j ∈ H, the simulator S simulates an ideal call to F com by extracting (m j , ρ j ) from A.
If all the {m j } j∈H are equal, then S sets m * = m 1 . Otherwise S sets m * = dummy.
2. For each j ∈ H, the simulator simulates an ideal call to F Sign as follows: it first extracts (pk j,n+1 , (com j,n+1 , sid n+1 )) from A and then:
• If (pk j,n+1 , (com j,n+1 , sid n+1 )) = (pk j , (com j , sid)), then S computes the signature σ j = Sign sk j (com j , sid) and gives σ j to A as the output of F Sign .
• Otherwise, S gives ⊥ to A as the output of F Sign .
3. For each j ∈ H, the simulator S simulates two ideal calls to F com . Let (m j , ρ j ) denote the inputs submitted by A to the first instance of F com , and let com j = C(m j ; ρ j ). Let (m j , r j ) denote the inputs submitted by A to the second instance of F com , and let com j = C(m j ; r j ).
S initializes H = H. Then for each j ∈ H it does:
(a) Extract the inputs (dec j , dec j , dec j ) submitted by A to the relevant instance of F zk .
(b) If F zk would output 1 to P j (note that S can easily compute this, since an honest P j would input (com j , com j ) to F zk ), then
• If m j = m * , do nothing.
• If m j = dummy, remove j from H .
• If m j ∈ {m * , dummy}, set fail = true.
(c) If F zk would output 0 to P j , then set r j = 0 k and remove j from H . m, r 1 , . . . , r n , H to F sid bcast on behalf of P n+1 , and sends 1 to F sid bcast on behalf of the other parties in I. It then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
S sends
It is straightforward to see that S, as above, satisfies Definition 2 (under the assumption that every honest party P i holds input b i = 1). Indeed, the view of A in a hybrid-world execution of protocol Π sid bcast is distributed identically to its view when run as a subroutine by S in an ideal-world execution of F sid bcast . The only difference is with regard to the outputs of the honest parties, where a difference occurs only in case fail is set to true at the end of S's execution. (If fail is false then in the hybrid world every honest party P j outputs a commitment com j to a message m j ∈ {m * , dummy}, just as in the ideal world.) But it is easy to see what whenever fail is set to true then A has forged a valid signature with respect to one of the honest party's public keys.
The two claims above prove the theorem.
C Proof of Theorem 4.1
We prove Theorem 4.1 by separately proving that Π satisfies Definitions 1 and 2.
C.1 Collusion-Freeness of Π (Honest Mediator)
Let I denote the set of corrupted parties. We show independent transformations {Sim j } j∈I that satisfy Definition 1. The proof is quite straightforward, given the construction of Π, since parties essentially learn nothing until the final round of the protocol. We remark that, in this proof, we rely only on the hiding property of the commitment scheme C.
Sim j , given oracle access to P j , does as follows:
1. Sim j runs P j to generate pk j . Then Sim j is given the vector of public keys (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ), an input x j , and auxiliary input aux j . It runs P j on these inputs.
2. Sim j simulates F com by extracting dec
3. Sim j simulates an ideal call to F ct by choosing random dec rand j = (r j , s j ) and giving these values to P j . Let com rand j = C(r j ; s j ).
4. Initialize abort = false. Then for i = 1 to r: (a) If it is P j 's turn to speak in π, then Sim j simulates a call to F π compute as follows: -Let C j = (com j 1 , . . . , com j i−1 ) be the commitments given to P j in the previous rounds.
), or rid = 0i, or (sk j , pk j ) ∈ Range(Gen), then set abort = true.
-In any case, Sim j returns ⊥ to P j .
(b) Sim j simulates a call to F sid bcast by extracting a bit b j from P j . If b j = 0 then Sim j sets abort = true. In any case, Sim j returns to P j a commitment com j i to a 0-string of the appropriate length.
5. If abort = false then Sim j sends x i to the trusted party computing F. Otherwise, Sim j sends ⊥ to the trusted party computing F. In return, Sim j is given output out j .
6. To complete the simulation, Sim j simulates a call to F π output :
) then Sim j gives ⊥ to P j . Otherwise, Sim j gives out j to P j . It then halts and outputs whatever P j outputs.
It is straightforward to see that Definition 1 holds for the {Sim j } j∈I defined above. Indeed, the only difference between the hybrid-world experiment in which Π is run, and the ideal-world execution with ideal functionality computing F, is with regard to the commitments {com j i } i∈ [r] ,j∈I . But since these commitments are computed independently with fresh random coins in each experiment, the hiding property of C immediately implies that these two experiments are indistinguishable.
C.2 Security of Π (Corrupt Mediator)
In this section we prove that Π satisfies Definition 2; i.e., that it securely computes F in the case of a dishonest mediator, in a hybrid model where a trusted party computes the functionalities F com , F ct , F sid bcast , F π compute and F π output . We are thus given a single, coordinated adversary A a set of corrupted parties I that includes the mediator, and we construct a single simulator S controlling the same parties. The simulator S uses the black-box simulator S π that is guaranteed to exist for the protocol π that securely computes F in the stand-alone model.
We let H = [n] \ I denote the set of honest parties. Let z denote the auxiliary input received by the adversary and let x i be the input of party P i . The simulator S works as follows:
Simulation of the PKI setup:
1. For each i ∈ H, the simulator S runs (sk i , pk i ) ← Gen(1 k ). It also runs A to obtain the public keys {pk i } i∈I . Let pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) denote the vector of public keys.
Simulation of input commitment/coin-tossing stage:
1. S invokes A with inputs {x i } i∈I , auxiliary input z, and the vector of public keys pk.
2. For every j ∈ H, the simulator S simulates F com by sending to P n+1 the commitment com input j = C(0 k ; s j ) for a random s j . (Since A controls P n+1 , from now on we will refer to S handing messages directly to A and not to P n+1 .) 3. For every j ∈ H, the simulator S simulates F ct by handing A the commitment com rand j = C(0 ; s j ), where is the length of the random-tape that is generated by F ct .
Simulation of the round-by-round emulation stage: S invokes S π to simulate the messages of π to A; recall that S π is a black-box simulator and so it does not receive any auxiliary input, and works by querying the adversary with vectors of messages sent in the protocol. We let (α 1 , . . . , α ) denote the messages corresponding to the first rounds of the protocol. If j denotes a round of π in which a malicious party speaks, we may assume that S π does not query the adversary with (α 1 , . . . , α j , . . . , α ) unless it has previously queried the adversary with vector (α 1 , . . . , α j−1 ) and received message α j in return. We further assume that whenever S π sends a vector of length to the adversary then it is always a corrupted party who speaks in round + 1. Finally, we assume that S π 's output is a vector containing all r messages sent in the protocol.
S runs S π as follows:
• When S π sends a vector of messages (α 1 , . . . , α ) to its adversary in the simulation of π, let < denote the largest index such that a malicious party speaks in round . Thus, the values α +1 , . . . , α all denote messages that are sent by honest parties in π. (b) S then simulates a call to F sid bcast by extracting the relevant inputs from {P j } j∈I , returning the relevant outputs to {P j } j∈I , and computing outputs for the honest parties in the obvious way.
2. In round + 1 it is the turn of some corrupted party to speak. Say that the next round in which an honest party speaks is round + 1, and that honest party P k speaks in that round. Then for i = +1 to , the simulator S simulates calls to F sid bcast by extracting the relevant inputs from {P j } j∈I , handing the relevant outputs to {P j } j∈I , and computing the outputs of F sid bcast for P k ; these will be a sequence of commitments com k +1 , . . . , com k . From the inputs to all the calls of F sid bcast , the simulator can determine the messages (α +1 , σ +1 ), . . . , (α , σ ) underlying these commitments. If any of these are dummy commitments, these are treated as an abort. S returns (α +1 , . . . , α ) to S π .
• When S π wishes to send inputs {x i } i∈I to the trusted party computing F, then S sends {x i } i∈I to its trusted party and hands to S π the outputs {out i } i∈I it receives in return.
• When S π outputs the final vector of messages (α 1 , . . . , α r ), then S rewinds A to the point where it received response α r and proceeds to the next step of the simulation.
Simulation of output determination stage:
1. S initializes H = H. For each honest party P j , the simulator S simulates F π output with A.
• If the inputs of A would cause F π output to send ⊥, then S removes j from H . • Let (msg 1 , σ 1 ) , . . . , (msg r , σ r ) denote the committed values in the vector C j submitted by A (cf. step 3 of F π output in Figure 2 ). If msg k = α k for some k, then S also removes j from H . (Again, this event implies that A has forged a signature of an honest party.) 2. S sends H to the trusted party and halts, outputting whatever A outputs.
We let ideal F,S(z) ( 1 k , x) denote the output of the honest parties and S in the ideal-world execution above, and let hyb Π,A(z) (1 k , x) denote the output of the honest parties and A in the hybrid-model execution of Π. We sketch the proof that these two experiments are computationally indistinguishable. The proof proceeds using two hybrid experiments:
Hybrid H 1 : Here we execute hyb Π,A(z) (1 k , x) , except that we change the way F π compute and F π output are defined. Specifically, for a round i in which an honest party speaks in π, let msg * i denote the message output by the invocation of F π compute in that round. (I.e., msg * i is the round-i message generated by an honest party in π via the call to F π compute .) Then we add a step between steps 3 and 4 of both F π compute and F π output as follows:
• If there is an i where an honest party speaks in round i but
It is not hard to see that the outcome of this experiment is statistically close to hyb Π,A(z) (1 k , x) , since the above rule is only applied when A has forged a signature of an honest party.
Hybrid H 2 : This experiment is the same as H 1 , except that we substitute commitments to garbage for the outputs of F com and F ct in the input commitment/coin-tossing phase. It is straightforward to show that the output distributions of H 2 and H 1 are computationally indistinguishable by reduction to the hiding property of the commitment scheme.
The indistinguishability of the output distributions in H 2 and ideal F,S(z) ( 1 k , x) follows from the assumption that S π is a "good" simulator for π. In particular, given a vector of messages α = (α 1 , . . . , α r ), a distinguisher D can run the same steps as in experiment H 2 , but using α instead of generating the π-messages itself. Now, if α is generated by a real execution of π, then the experiment is exactly H 2 . In contrast, if α is the output of S π , then the experiment is exactly ideal F,S(z) ( 1 k , x) . This completes the proof.
D Composition Theorems in the Mediated Model
Once again, we deal separately with the case of an honest mediator and a dishonest mediator.
D.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Here we have an honest mediator, and prove a composition theorem for the property of collusionfreeness. A proof of the theorem follows exactly along the lines of [5] , and so we only sketch the details. We assume for simplicity that Π makes only a single call to ρ though, as in [5] , the proof easily extends to the general case.
Let I ⊂ [n] denote a set of corrupted parties, and let {A i } i∈I denote a collection of probabilistic
D.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Let Π be a protocol that securely computes F in the G-hybrid model for concurrent self composition, where Π makes m calls to G and P n+1 plays the role of the second party in all calls to G. Let ρ be a two-party protocol that securely computes G under m-bounded concurrent self-composition. (See Appendix E for appropriate definitions.) We need to prove that the composed protocol Π ρ satisfies Definition 2; that is, that it is secure when the mediator is dishonest. A proof of this statement boils down to the observation that, when considering a malicious mediator, there are only syntactic differences between the experiment in which Π ρ is run in the real mediated model and the experiment in which multiple concurrent executions of ρ are run. Specifically, the instructions of Π for each honest party define a set of input-selecting machines as in the definition of concurrent self composition (see Appendix E). Furthermore, since Π makes at most m calls to G, the security of ρ under m-bounded concurrent self composition implies that for every A there exists a simulator S such that the output of an execution of Π ρ in the real model with adversary A is computationally indistinguishable from an execution of Π with S in the G-hybrid model. By the assumed security of Π in the G-hybrid model, we then have that for every S there exists an S such that the output of an execution of Π with S in the G-hybrid model is indistinguishable from the output of an ideal execution with S and a trusted party computing F. Combining these results, we conclude that Π ρ securely computes F as required.
E Security Under Bounded-Concurrent Self Composition
In this section we present the definitions for security under m-bounded concurrent self composition [15] . Loosely speaking, this relates to a setting where a single protocol computing a functionality F = (f 1 , f 2 ) is run m times concurrently, and is the only protocol being run. We focus only on two-party protocols, as this is all we use in this work.
Overview. Fix a two-party functionality F = (f 1 , f 2 ). Security of a protocol ρ computing F is, as usual, analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in the real world to what it can do in an ideal world that is clearly secure. In both worlds, we will consider parties who perform multiple (concurrent) computations of F. In the real world, these computations are performed by having the parties run multiple executions of ρ; in the ideal world, these computations are done by having the parties interact in multiple sessions with a trusted party who computes F on their behalf.
We assume an adversary who takes part in all computations of F, always playing the role of P 2 . We also have several parties P 1 1 , P 2 1 , . . . taking part in various computations of F, always playing the role of P 1 . In both the real and ideal worlds, the adversary may coordinate its actions in the various executions/sessions, but each honest P j 1 may choose its input depending on prior outputs it has received, but otherwise acts independently in each execution/session.
The process by which an honest P Concurrent computation in the ideal model. We have an adversary S who always plays the role of P 2 . The ideal world execution proceeds as follows:
Inputs: Each P j 1 is given initial input x j ; S is given initial input y and auxiliary input z.
In the setting of m-bounded concurrency, the scheduling by the adversary must fulfill the following condition: for every execution, from the time that execution begins until the time that it ends, messages from at most m other executions can be sent. This definition of concurrency covers the case when m executions are run simultaneously; it also includes the more general case where more than m executions take place overall, but each execution overlaps with at most m other executions. In this setting, the value m is fixed ahead of time, and the protocol design may depend on the choice of m. The real m-bounded concurrent execution of ρ (with security parameter k, input-selecting machines M = (M , x, y) , consists of the outputs of the honest parties and the output of the adversary in the above execution.
Security as emulation of a real execution in the ideal model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of protocols. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if for every real-model adversary A and input-selecting machines M , there exists an ideal model adversary S such that for all initial inputs x, y, the outcome of an ideal execution with S is computationally indistinguishable from the outcome of a real protocol execution with A. Notice that the order of quantifiers is such that S may depend on M . Thus, S knows the strategies used by the honest parties to choose their inputs. However, S does not know the initial inputs of the honest parties, nor the random tapes used by its input-selecting machines. We now present the definition: The hybrid model for concurrent self composition. In, e.g., Theorem 4.3 we refer to "the hybrid model for concurrent self composition". What we mean by this is a model whereby the parties have access to a trusted party who behaves exactly as described in the ideal model above.
The only reason we call it a "hybrid" model is that there is another protocol that instructs the parties how to behave.
